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Abstract—Malicious calls, i.e., telephony spams and scams,
have been a long-standing challenging issue that causes billions
of dollars of annual financial loss worldwide. This work presents
the first machine learning-based solution without relying on any
particular assumptions on the underlying telephony network
infrastructures.
The main challenge of this decade-long problem is that it is
unclear how to construct effective features without the access to
the telephony networks’ infrastructures. We solve this problem by
combining several innovations. We first develop a TouchPal user
interface on top of a mobile App to allow users tagging malicious
calls. This allows us to maintain a large-scale call log database.
We then conduct a measurement study over three months of
call logs, including 9 billion records. We design 29 features
based on the results, so that machine learning algorithms can be
used to predict malicious calls. We extensively evaluate different
state-of-the-art machine learning approaches using the proposed
features, and the results show that the best approach can
reduce up to 90% unblocked malicious calls while maintaining a
precision over 99.99% on the benign call traffic. The results also
show the models are efficient to implement without incurring a
significant latency overhead. We also conduct ablation analysis,
which reveals that using 10 out of the 29 features can reach a
performance comparable to using all features.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spams and scams through telephony networks have caused
an annual financial loss that is worth billions of dollars all
over the world [1]–[3]. We refer to them as malicious calls.
Unfortunately, there has been no simple and effective solution
to stop them [33]. Although countries, such as US, have
established National Do Not Call Registry to mitigate the
issue, the problem is more severe in countries such as China,
where such legislation is not available.
One of the main challenge is the lack of effective in-
formation for accurate malicious calls detection. Different
from traditional email spams, malicious calls typically demand
instant responses before the content in the call has been heard.
Thus, only the header information can be used to prevent
malicious calls from causing recipients to lose time, money,
and productivity. Prior malicious call prevention techniques
mainly focus on Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT), and
rely on server side information about the caller to predict
malicious calls [7], [11], [19], [21], [24], [31], [34], [36], [40].
However, such information is typically unavailable for the end
users on traditional telephony networks.
In this work, we focus on the malicious call prevention prob-
lem without relying on any particular underlying telephony
network infrastructure. Thus the first challenge is how to
gather effective information. The first contribution of this work
is to collect information about malicious callers in order to
build an effective prevention mechanism, using the TouchPal
user interface. The basic idea is to implement TouchPal as
a functionality of a mobile App that has a large number of
users. Then TouchPal allows its users to label a finished call
as malicious or not, and implements a simple reputation-based
black-listing prevention mechanism based on users’ tagging.
TouchPal also promptly suggests users to label suspicious
calls. This design also increases the tagged call log volume
in addition to users’ voluntary labeling through malicious
call reporting services, such as 12321. In doing so, we can
gather a large call log dataset without relying on any particular
telephony network infrastructure.
Although the simple black-listing approach is effective, it
has to observe enough call records from one malicious number
before TouchPal can black-list the number. Our next question
is: how can we build an effective mechanism to detect a
malicious call number early without answering too many calls
dialed from the number? We seek a machine learning solution.
The main obstacle is to design a set of effective features. To
this end, we rely on the data logs collected from TouchPal to
analyze which information is effective to be used as a feature.
In fact, over the past several years, TouchPal has reached over
56 million daily active users and kept track of billions of call
records monthly. Nowadays, TouchPal maintains the largest
call log databases in China with respect to both call ID volume
and call tag volume.
Using this dataset, we conduct a large scale measurement
study to understand which information is more helpful to dis-
tinguish malicious calls from benign ones. Note that there have
been several prior work providing measurement studies [15],
[22]. However, these work mainly focused on malicious call
records, and did not provide insights on how malicious call
records differ from benign ones. Also, they focused on US call
records, and it is unclear whether the same conclusions apply
to Chinese malicious call ecosystems. MobiPot [9] provides a
study to overcome these two issues; however, the study relies
on only less than 700 call records, and we show that the
observations from [9] are not robust when we increase the
samples size by 7 orders of magnitude.
Our study overcomes all these issues, and sheds new light
on the feature design, which is the core problem of this work.
Our results reveal that (1) the provincial malicious call volume
is more sensitive to the province’s Gross Domestic Product
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(GDP) than benign calls; (2) malicious calls are more likely
to happen in a workday and during working hours than benign
calls; and (3) the volume of incoming and outgoing calls from
a number is indicative to distinguish malicious calls from
benign calls. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
present these findings with respect to distinguishing malicious
calls from benign ones.
Inspired by our measurement study, we design 29 features
for the malicious call prediction problem to include not only
static information about the current call, but also extended
information by examining historic records about the caller of
an incoming call and by cross-referencing multiple records.
We extensively evaluate the effectiveness of these features
by using several state-of-the-art models. To this end, we
use both the standard AUC score, and design a new metric,
average first prediction (AFP). AFP is designed to evaluate
the averaged amount of malicious calls that needs be observed
before an approach can predict it as a malicious caller, without
affecting benign call traffics. Our evaluation shows that using
our proposed features, a random forest model can achieve an
AUC score of at least 0.99; further, it reduces the averaged
necessary observed malicious calls by up to 90% from a
black-listing approach, while guaranteeing that over 99.99%
of the benign calls will not be blocked. In other words, the
best random forest model using our 29 proposed features can
reduce 90% unblocked malicious calls.
Also, the evaluation shows that a neural network model can
achieve a similar accuracy performance as the best random
forest, but incurs a low latency overhead of less than 1ms.
This shows that the models in our evaluation can be efficiently
implemented on top of the current infrastructure to achieve
both high accuracy and high efficiency.
We further conduct ablation study to understand the effec-
tiveness of each proposed feature, and our evaluation shows
that only 10 features are necessary to reach a high accuracy
instead of the entire 29 features.
We summarize our contributions as follows.
1) We develop the TouchPal user interface to keep track
of malicious calls and benign calls. Using this approach,
TouchPal has maintained the largest call log database in
China with respect to call ID volume, total call record
volume, and malicious call volume;
2) We conduct a measurement study on the large scale call
logs without sensitive user information to draw insights
to design effective features for a machine learning-based
malicious call prevention approach;
3) We propose 29 features, and extensively evaluate 6 state-
of-the-art machine learning approaches. The results show
that the best random forest model can achieve an AUC
score of at least 0.99, and reduces up to 90% unblocked
malicious calls compared with a black-listing approach,
while at least 99.99% of the benign traffic will not be
blocked;
4) We evaluate the model’s runtime performance, and show
that some of the performant models incur small latency
overhead. Thus, the proposed approach can be efficiently
implemented on top of the current structure;
5) To further understand the effectiveness of the proposed
features, we conduct ablation analysis. We find that some
features are more useful than others, and in an extreme
case, using the top-10 most useful features can achieve a
comparable performance to using all 29 features.
II. OVERVIEW
In this section, we present an overview of the malicious
call prevention problem and the TouchPal solution. We will
first briefly review the malicious call status in China, and
then define the problem by providing the requirements of
malicious call prevention. We will then give an overview of
the TouchPal solution, with the highlights of our technical
development in this paper.
A. Malicious calls in China
The legislation status in China against malicious calls is
pre-mature. Services, such as National Do Not Call Registry
in US, have not been available in China. The main channel
provided by Chinese government is 12321, a dedicated service
for reporting malicious calls and SMS messages. However,
12321 mainly relies on users’ volunteer reporting; also, it is
unclear how this information is eventually used.
Two policies are enforced by Chinese government, which
may have effect on malicious calls. First, telecommunication
providers in China are required to register a real-identity with
every phone number. Second, a number dialing another in a
different province will incur a long-distance cost. These two
policies may increase the cost for a malicious caller. However,
starting from September 1st, 2017, the long-distance fee has
been canceled along with roaming cost [4].
B. Malicious call prevention
We consider the problem to prevent malicious calls on the
mobile side. That is, a malicious call preventer is implemented
on the mobile phones to provide the service to detect whether
an incoming call will be a malicious call. As we will explain
in Section III, we mainly consider harassing and phishing calls
as malicious calls. We have the following requirements.
Without the access to the underlying telephony network
infrastructure. We require the solution to be deployed on end-
users’ devices; so, it does not have access to many information
about the caller that is only available from the servers in
telecommunication providers. This eliminates most of the
existing SPIT prevention proposals. However, we emphasize
that this requirement does not prevent a solution leveraging
an server to collect and store information reported from the
mobile devices.
Light-weight for users. The prevention mechanism should
not incur many additional operations to end users. Ideally,
the users should receive a benign call or dial a number as
usual, and only need to operate the phone differently when
the incoming call is predicted as a malicious call.
Effectiveness. The solution should not prevent users from
receiving benign calls. A majority of the benign calls (i.e.,
≥ 99.99%) should pass through the malicious call detector.
Early detection. Ideally, an effective malicious call preventer
should start blocking all malicious calls from a phone number
when as few malicious calls have been made as possible.
Efficiency. The malicious call preventer should incur a low
latency overhead on the phone side to detect whether an
incoming call is a malicious call. Ideally, the latency overhead
should be 10ms or lower.
C. Solution overview
We now present the overview of our solution to use machine
learning for malicious call prevention. We built TouchPal
(Section III) as an additional functionality on top of a mobile
App, which has hundreds of millions of users. TouchPal
provides the functionality to allow users to label a phone
call as malicious, and employs a reputation-based black-listing
malicious call prevention mechanism.
However, the black-listing approach requires the same num-
ber to be labeled multiple times before it can be marked as
a malicious caller and blocked. To mitigate this issue, we
develop a machine learning approach to predict whether a
phone number is a malicious caller before it has made too
many malicious calls.
The main challenge is how to design effective features
without tapping users call content. To this end, TouchPal
keeps a call log containing each call record about a TouchPal
user. In the call record, only less sensitive information such
as call duration and call time is stored.
Though the call log hides sensitive information, its scale
allows us to make important observations. We conduct a large
scale measurement study (Section IV) using data over a period
of three months containing 9 billion call records, and examine
which information is more helpful to distinguish malicious
callers from benign ones. Our study thus sheds light on the
design of the selection of features (Section V).
Intuitively, besides the basic set of features about the current
call, information from historic call records and information
from multiple records can be useful in detecting malicious
calls. We extensively evaluate several state-of-the-art machine
learning approaches (Section VI), including random forest,
neural networks, SVM, and logistic regression, and we observe
that most of the models can achieve a high performance. First,
the AUC scores of most models can achieve 0.99 or higher.
More importantly, we enforce the precision of benign calls to
be at least 0.99, and evaluate how many malicious calls need
be observe before the number can be detected. Our evaluation
shows that a random forest or a neural network only need to
observe 2.5 calls on average to detect a malicious caller; we
thus reduce up to 90% unblocked malicious calls using the
current black-listing approach in TouchPal.
III. TouchPal FOR MALICIOUS CALL PREVENTION
In this section, we explain the pipeline of TouchPal to
help the users to prevent malicious calls. TouchPal employs
(a) Prompt to label tags (b) Prompt to reject a scam call
Fig. 1: TouchPal UI on Android
a reputation-based black-listing approach to prevent malicious
calls. TouchPal allows users to label malicious calls. Based
on such information, TouchPal will mark a phone number as
malicious when TouchPal is confident to do so. We explain
the details in the following.
Information collection. The user interface for TouchPal
to allow users to label malicious callers are provided in
Figure 1a. When a call finishes, TouchPal employs some
simple heuristics to detect suspicious calls and prompt users
with the labeling interface. Doing so can increases the chance
that a user may label a call, since most users are reluctant to
label calls actively. The heuristics are designed so that the
prompt is shown to users only when the call is highly likely
to be labeled, so as to reduce the burden to TouchPal users.
In particular, if a number is never tagged (almost sure benign)
or already blacklisted (almost sure malicious), TouchPal will
not prompt its users; only when TouchPal is not sure about
a number, it will prompt its users for tagging. Even if the
prompt is not showing up, TouchPal still provides a button in
the call history to label a malicious call.
A TouchPal user can choose one among five pre-defined
tags to label a call. The sixth tag allows users to customize
their tags. The five built-in tags are Real Estate Agency,
Harassment (for spams), Delivery, Fraud (for scams), and
Salesperson. These categories are created based on the an
internal survey about what types of calls that TouchPal users
mostly want to block. TouchPal also provides information
about the most frequently labeled tag and its frequency. In
our analysis, we take Harassment and Fraud as malicious call
tags, and others as benign ones.
Simple reputation-based black-listing. TouchPal uses a
sophisticated and conservative policy to tag as many phone
numbers as possible, while minimizing the amount of wrong
Field Explanation
user id TouchPal user ID
call type A binary value indicating if this is an incomingor an outgoing call
other phone The anonymized phone number in this call otherthan the TouchPal user
other phone md5 A unique encryption for each phone number
call date The timestamp (in seconds) of the start of the call
call duration The number of seconds the call lasts
call contact A binary value indicating if the other number isin the contact of the TouchPal user
call tag The tag of the call
TABLE I: The structure of data log records.
tags. Multiple information sources are used to tag a phone
number. One of the main sources is the tag provided from
users. However, it is very common that users may mislabel
some phone numbers. TouchPal imposes a threshold, which
may differ from 30 to 100, to be confident about the tag of
a phone number. For example, 10086, the service number of
China Mobile, is frequently labeled as Harassment by users,
and its threshold is thus set to be very high. Other information
sources are also used to confirm the tag. For example, real
estate agency typically provides their numbers online, and
TouchPal crawls the websites for those numbers to confirm
the tag. Note that the threshold used in TouchPal is not static,
and may vary from one number to another.
Note that the reputation from this black-listing approach
also serves the ground-truth to build our machine learning
models. Since TouchPal only allows its users to tag malicious
calls rather than benign ones, it is hard for malicious users to
taint the labels as long as there are enough benign users who
label malicious call numbers as malicious.
Malicious call prevention. TouchPal allows user to configure
the default behavior when the phone number of an incoming
call is marked with a tag. For example, the user can choose to
hang up a malicious call directly without any notification, or
choose to prompt the user. Figure 1b illustrates the interface
when an incoming call’s phone number is marked as Fraud.
Note that although TouchPal provides a functionality to record
the call content, users have to manually turn it on for each
call; also, the recording is only available on users’ devices
and never uploaded to the server.
The prevention in the current deployment is entirely based
on the phone number tag, which can be easily circumvented
by using techniques such as caller ID spoofing. We consider
this issue as an important future direction.
Other functionalities. TouchPal also provides other function-
alities such as SMS message prevention. In this work, we focus
on the malicious call prevention problem.
IV. UNDERSTANDING MALICIOUS CALLS IN CHINA
In this section, we investigate the call logs to gain insights
on malicious callers’ behaviors, and shed light on designing
machine learning-based malicious call detection algorithms.
In the following, we first present the structure of the call
log, and some basic statistics. Then, we study the distribution
Oct Nov Dec Total
Call records 3,043 2,959 3,001 9,002
Benign call records 3,017 2,933 2,979 8,929
Malicious call records 26 25 22 73
Distinct callers 256 248 248 447
Distinct callees 299 288 287 519
Distinct TouchPal users 24 24 24 35
Distinct malicious call numbers 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.8
Distinct other numbers 348 338 335 583
TABLE II: Statistics of data log (million) from October to
December 2016
of TouchPal users, malicious calls, and other numbers along
several dimensions: (1) provinces; (2) call time; (3) whether
caller is a TouchPal user and/or in the callee’s contact; (4)
incoming and outgoing call volume; and (5) activeness. For
the majority of the analysis, we use call logs spanning three
months from October to December 2016. For the liveness
analysis, we use all call logs of the entire year of 2016.
A. Data log description
The structure of each data log record is presented in Table I.
When a TouchPal user makes or receives a call, a log record
will be generated. The call type field records whether the user
receives the call or makes the call. The other number in the call
is anonymized by removing all digits except the first few digits
which are similar to the area code in US numbers. These digits
contain only the provincial information about the number. The
salted MD5 of the entire number is also recorded so that it
is possible to distinguish between different numbers for our
analysis. In doing so, we break the link from data log to the
actual phone numbers to maintain the anonymity. Note that the
mapping from a user ID to a phone MD5 is highly confidential.
We avoid touching this mapping in all our analysis.
The record contains three types of information about the
call: (1) the timestamp, which includes both the date and
the time; (2) duration in seconds; and (3) whether the other
number is in the contact of the TouchPal user. They can
be used for predicting malicious calls. Each call record also
contains a call tag field recording whether the call belongs to
one of the 6 categories (i.e., normal or one of the five tags).
This field is used as the ground truth of our malicious call
prediction task.
In our entire work, we use two other tables which provide
more information: (1) the province that each TouchPal user
belongs to; and (2) the set of all MD5 hash values of TouchPal
users.
We compute the basic statistics of the data log from October
to December 2016, and report them in Table II. Note that
each call between two TouchPal users generates two records:
one for incoming call and another for outgoing call. We can
observe over 9 billion call records and over 500 million distinct
phone numbers in the period of consideration. The scale of the
dataset is sufficiently large for us to draw interesting conclu-
sions. We observe that malicious call records are relatively
few with respect to the total records, as expected. There are
over 73 million malicious call records with around 800,000
Fig. 2: The histogram of callers from different provinces. The amount of malicious callers, benign callers, and their ratio are
computed for each province. The provinces on the x-axis are listed in the descending order of their total amount of calls.
(a) benign calls (b) malicious calls
Fig. 3: The histogram of the number of benign calls and
malicious calls in October 2016. We include call records from
all provinces in the results.
(a) benign calls (b) malicious calls
Fig. 4: Histogram of hourly distribution for benign call and
malicious calls. We include call records from all provinces in
the results.
numbers used to make malicious calls. In other words, out
of every 100 calls, there will be almost one malicious call,
showing that the malicious call problem is severe in China.
On average, each malicious call numbers makes 91 malicious
calls . Thus identifying a malicious call number earlier (e.g.,
before it has been used to make 10 malicious calls) can help
to prevent a significant amount of malicious calls.
Validating the ground truth. In this study, we mainly rely on
user taggings to compute the ground truth. To validate whether
this is accurate, we randomly sample a subset of malicious call
numbers, and call them back. We observe that most of the
numbers are not answered albeit multiple attempts in different
time. We confirm such numbers as malicious, which constitute
the majority. However, there is also a small portion of the
numbers that are indeed answered. We find that they belong
to personal phone numbers of sales-related professionals (e.g.,
bankers). Note, although TouchPal provides a specific tag,
most Chinese users still consider cold calls from sales-related
professionals as malicious. So far, we are unable to distinguish
such numbers from other malicious calls in a large scale, but
we consider them as future work.
Ethical remarks. TouchPal users have to agree on the
Terms of Use to access to the full functionality of TouchPal.
TouchPal notifies its users about data collection through the
Terms of Use. Also, TouchPal users have the opt-out option,
so that their call history will not be collected, at the cost
that the functionality they can use is limited. Our study only
touches the users who have agreed to the Terms of Use.
B. Call distribution across different provinces
We calculate the histogram of the amounts of malicious
call records and all call records, and their ratio for different
provinces, and present the results in Figure 2. In the figure,
the provinces are listed in descending order based on the
total number of calls in the province. We observe that the
distribution is very skewed, and a province with a high volume
of calls does not imply that it must also have a high volume
of malicious calls.
We also make some interesting observations. First, the
amount of malicious callers is partially co-related with the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for each province. For exam-
ple, among the top-8 provinces with the maximal amounts of
malicious callers, 6 of them are also ranked the top-6 based
on their GDP in 2016 [23], and the other two are Beijing and
Shanghai, i.e., the two largest municipalities in China. This
implies that malicious calls in an area may be associated with
its economic activities. Second, the amount of total calls may
not be associated with the GDP. For example, Shanxi is ranked
at 7 based on their total amount of calls, but their GDP ranking
is among the bottom 10.
C. Call distribution across different dates and time
In this section, we study the distributions of malicious calls
and benign calls with respect to (1) dates in a year; (2) days
in a week; and (3) hours in a day.
We plot the histogram of benign calls and malicious calls
for each day in October 2016 in Figure 3. We observe that
the amount of malicious call records during October 1st to
October 7th is significantly smaller than other days. This
period coincides with the observances of National Day of
China when most of the workers were on vacation, and we
attribute the observation to this reason. Also, we observe that
the malicious call records are reduced significantly three times
later, i.e., 15th-16th, 22nd-23rd, and 29th-30th. These three
periods are all weekends. We observe similar phenomenon
for November and December (see Figure 12 and Figure 13
in the appendix). Therefore, we conclude that the number of
malicious calls are associated with whether or not the date of
the call is a working day.
On the other hand, however, the correlation between the
benign call volume and working days is not as strong as the
malicious call volume. We observe a drop of call volume
between October 2nd and October 7th, but the amount of
benign calls on the 1st is larger than all other days in October.
One potential reason may be due to Chinese social convention
to make greeting calls at the beginning of a vocation. We
lack information to further analyze the reason behind this
observation, but this can be of independent interests to some
social science disciplines.
We continue to analyze the hourly pattern of benign calls
and malicious calls. The histograms are presented in Figure 4.
We observe the similar phenomenon: the amount of malicious
calls is significantly higher during working hours than off-
hours. Also, the malicious calls from noon to 1pm, which is
the typical lunch time, are fewer than those during 9am-noon
or 1pm-5pm. These observations also confirm that the amount
of malicious calls are more correlated with the working hours
than benign calls.
Note that our observations are very different than the ones
shown in [9], which also aims to understand Chinese malicious
calling behaviors. We attribute this to the fact that only less
than 700 call records are collected in [9], and thus the results
in [9] may not be statistically robust. On the other hand, similar
observations have been made based on US’s data [15], though
some details are different. For example, the hourly call volume
histogram from [15] looks more similar to Figure 4a for benign
calls than Figure 4b for malicious calls.
(a) Incoming calls (b) Outgoing calls
Fig. 5: Distribution of phone numbers based on their incoming
and outgoing call volume.
All above observations suggest that the call time may be
a useful indicator to distinguish malicious calls from benign
ones.
D. TouchPal users may be unlikely to make malicious calls,
but may store malicious callers in their contact
Now we investigate whether TouchPal users will use their
registered phone numbers to make malicious calls. We hypoth-
esize that TouchPal users may unlikely use their registered
numbers to make malicious calls because they understand
the mechanism how TouchPal prevents malicious calls. We
observe that this is indeed the case. Out of the 73 million ma-
licious call records, we identify 103, 673 (i.e., 0.14%) records
whose callers are TouchPal users. Among these records, we
find 2, 541 distinct TouchPal users (i.e., 0.007% of 35 million
TouchPal users or 0.32% of 0.8 million malicious callers).
Note that our data labeling is not perfect, and it is also
possible that some of these numbers are mislabeled. Therefore,
we conclude that TouchPal users are unlikely to use their
registered phone numbers to make malicious calls.
We further analyze whether a TouchPal user’s contact may
be a robocaller. Conceptually, the owners of phone numbers
stored in a TouchPal user’s contact list likely have social
relationship with the user, and thus it is unlikely that they
are malicious callers. However, we observe the opposite.
Among all 73 million malicious call records, we observe 9.9
million of them (i.e., 13.56%) whose caller is in the contact
list of the callee. We conjecture the reason to be that our
malicious dataset may contain personal numbers of sales-
related professionals. Some TouchPal users who choose to
do business with these professionals may keep their numbers
in the contact list, while others may label the numbers as
malicious.
E. Phone number distributions based on incoming call volume
and outgoing call volume
For each phone number, we can compute the volume of
its incoming calls. For each n, we can compute how many
malicious call numbers receive n incoming calls, and then
compute their percentage among all malicious call numbers.
We plot these percentage values by varying n from [1, 600]
as a line in Figure 5a. Similarly, the two other lines are
drawn by considering incoming calls of TouchPal users and
all benign users. From the figure, we observe a long tail
distribution, which is consistent with earlier reports using a
Fig. 6: The distribution of active time
smaller dataset [15]. However, we observe that the tails of
malicious call numbers and TouchPal users are significantly
higher than benign phone numbers. This shows that there is
a higher percentage of malicious call users that are making
more calls than benign phone users. Therefore, the volume of
incoming calls metric of a number in the call log may be an
effective indicator for malicious calls.
Note that it is non-typical that a non-negligible portion of
malicious callers receive a large amount of incoming calls.
We conjecture that this is due to our labeled malicious callers
may contain sales-related professionals’ personal numbers as
explained above.
We further create similar plots for outgoing call data in
Figure 5b. We observe similar phenomenons: malicious callers
tend to make more calls than both TouchPal users and benign
phone numbers. Thus this information can be leveraged for
malicious call prediction.
F. Phone number Distribution of active time
We compute the total amount of days that a number is
actively used by computing the interval between its first call
and its last call in the log. For the analysis to be more
informative, we incorporate the data log of the entire 2016. We
then compute the distribution in a similar way as for incoming
and outgoing call volume analysis, and plot the results in
Figure 6.
We observe a “horseshoe”-shaped curve: there is a sharp
drop at the beginning, and then gradually grows up at the
end. We attribute this to the fact that a user may either stop
using a number after a short period of trial, or continue
using the number for a long-term. This phenomenon is more
significant on the plot for TouchPal users, for whom we have
the complete information in the call log.
Surprisingly, there is a much higher percentage of malicious
call numbers that are used through the entire year of 2016
than benign numbers or TouchPal users. The bottom of the
percentage plot for malicious call numbers appear around
200 days, and its percentage is also lower than both the
corresponding values for TouchPal users or benign numbers.
This phenomenon is somehow contradicting to the analysis
on spammers in other domains, in which a spam account’s
lifetime is very short. We also conjecture that the reason may
be due to our malicious dataset contains not only spam/scam
calls, but also sales-related calls. In this case, sales-related
numbers will be used for a longer time, since they are some
personal phone numbers. We plan to investigate them further
in the future.
V. MALICIOUS CALL PREVENTION USING MACHINE
LEARNING
In this section, we present our design of machine learning-
based prediction algorithm. In particular, we consider that
when a TouchPal user A receives a call from B, TouchPal
needs to predict whether this will be a malicious call. In the
following, we will first discuss the design of features, and
then present our choices of machine learning models. Since
TouchPal users are unlikely to make malicious calls, in this
work, we focus on non-TouchPal users, and leave handling
TouchPal malicious callers as a future direction.
A. Features
As we have discussed earlier, the most challenging problem
of malicious call detection is to design a set of informative
features. The set of features that we use are listed in Table III.
Intuitively, the basic set of features about a call include (1)
whether the caller is in the contact of the callee (is in contact);
(2) the date and time of the call (weekday and hour); and
(3) whether the caller is in the same province as the callee
(same location). However, this basic set of features is not
very informative for the detection model to be accurate. We
thus extend it in two orthogonal dimensions to extract further
information from the call log: historic information and cross-
referencing information. We explain them below.
Historic information. The basic features use only information
about the current call record. One dimension is to extend to
consider all relevant records in the call log. In particular, we
retrieve all records involving the current caller, which can
be either incoming or outgoing. For each of the records, we
can compute a set of features, and thus historic information
constitutes a sequence of features vectors.
For basic features, in additional to the basic set of features
explained above, there are two additional features that can be
computed for each historic record: (1) the call type indicating
whether the record is an incoming call or an outgoing call; and
(2) the duration of the call. Note that the call type feature is
excluded from static features, since in the current call, its value
is always “incoming call”. The duration of the current call is
unavailable before the call is answered.
Note that different callers may have different amount of
historic records, but a machine learning model typically takes
a fixed-length feature vector as input. We will explain how
to aggregate all historic feature vectors when discussing the
concrete machine learning models.
Cross-referencing information. For each call record, either
the current one or a historic one, static features considered so
far are computed using the information from one record only.
Category Feature Current Historic Value Description
St
at
ic
is in contact Binary Whether the other phone number is in the contact of the TouchPal user(call log field)
call type Binary Whether the call is an incoming call or an outgoing call (call log field)
duration Numeric The total amount of seconds that a call last (call log field)
weekday Numeric The day in a week when the call starts
hour Numeric The hour in a day when the call starts
same location Binary Whether the caller and callee are in the same province
C
ro
ss
-r
ef
er
en
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ng
caller outs Numeric How many outgoing calls that the caller made before the record
caller ins Numeric How many incoming calls that the caller received before the record
caller outdegree Numeric How many different phone numbers have been called by the caller beforethe record in consideration
caller indegree Numeric How many different phone numbers have called the caller beforethe record in consideration
callee outs Numeric The same as caller outs, caller ins, caller outdegree, caller indegree,callee ins Numeric but the statistics are computed based on the callee in the consideredcallee outdegree Numeric record rather than the callercallee indegree Numeric
n call Numeric n, where the record is the n-th call made by the callee in the record
is redial Binary Whether the current caller’s last call was with the same number as the current one
gap to next Numeric The interval (in seconds) between the considered record and the next recordmade by the same callee
TABLE III: All 29 input features. For the value type, binary indicates that the feature takes a value from {0, 1}. Numeric
indicates the feature takes an integer value. This value is either used directly as a one-dimensional feature, or converted into
a one-hot encoding vector. The vectors for all features are concatenated to form the entire input feature vector.
In addition, we also consider cross-referencing features which
are computed by accessing multiple call records in the log.
First, we consider the call log as a stream of records, and
thus given any point in the stream, we can take a snapshot
to contain only records before the point. In particular, given
any record, we can compute the following information of each
user based on the record’s snapshot: (1) how many incoming
calls (ins); (2) how many outgoing calls (outs); (3) how many
unique incoming call numbers (indegree); and (4) how many
unique outgoing call numbers (outdegree). For each call record
(either the current one or a historic one), we can compute these
four features for both the caller and the callee in the record.
They form the first 8 types of cross-referencing features. As we
have observed in Section IV, these statistics are very helpful
to distinguish malicious callers from benign callers.
Second, we consider that the current call is the n-th call
received by the TouchPal user A from the same caller B. Then
n call feature takes value n. Intuitively, when a TouchPal user
A has finished many calls with the caller B, it is less likely
that B is a malicious caller. Thus, we think n call can be a
useful feature.
Third, we consider whether the caller B just finishes a call
with the same TouchPal user A in his last call. This call can
be in either direction: from A to B or vice versa. If this is the
case, it is likely a redial, and thus less likely a malicious call.
We compute it as a binary feature is redial.
Fourth, the gap to next feature considers for each historic
record from the callee B, the gap (in seconds) between the
record and the next one. In fact, we hypothesize that the
malicious callers’ call pattern may be more prominent than
benign users’. Thus it is more likely to identify patterns based
on gap to next features.
Remarks. We want to further remark on the difference be-
tween the cross-referencing dimension and the historic di-
mension. Intuitively, historic features construct a sequence of
feature vectors as input; and each cross-referencing feature
only adds one additional dimension to each feature vector.
Therefore, these two are orthogonal dimensions of the feature
space.
We also remark on the novelty of our features. Previous
works have considered several features such as duration [41]
and call types and time [20]. However, most of existing
works propose ad hoc features grounded on an intuition. In
our work, in contrast, the features are designed under the
guidance of a large scale measurement study, and proposed
systematically following the two general dimensions discussed
above. In addition, several features, such as is in contact,
same location, and all cross-referencing features are newly
proposed in this work.
B. Machine learning models
The malicious call prediction problem is a standard binary
classification problem: classifying an input into either positive
(malicious) or negative (benign). We employ several state-
of-the-art machine learning models for this problem: neural
networks; random forest models [10]; Support Vector Machine
(SVM) models [13]; and logistic regression models [14].
We want to emphasize that while non-historic features
have fixed dimension, historic ones form a sequence of input
vectors. Therefore, we need to convert the sequence into a
fixed size input vector. For the above mentioned approaches,
we simply take the average of all the vectors in the sequence.
In addition, however, we can also employ a recurrent neural
network [16], which is designed to compute one embedding
vector from a sequence of input vectors. Due to the space
limitation, we explain the model details in the appendix.
We also want to remark that all considered models will
emit a score p, indicating the probability of the prediction is
positive. Therefore, we can set a model threshold τ , so that
the model will predict malicious when p ≥ τ , and benign vice
versa. By adjusting τ , a model can make a tradeoff between
its precision and recall.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate different machine learning
approaches with respect to their effectiveness to prevent mali-
cious call numbers in comparison with the simple black-listing
approach. In the following, we will first explain the experiment
setup. Then we will examine different models’ performance
(1) when trained and tested using data from the same province;
(2) when trained on one province and tested on another; and
(3) their overall latency. In the next section, we understand the
effectiveness of different features by an ablation analysis and
examining the features selected by a well-performing model,
which is a random forest.
A. Setup
In this section, we explain the experiment setup. We will
begin with implementation details of different models followed
by different metrics used to evaluate a model. In the end, we
present the details about training and test set construction.
Model implementation details. For vanilla neural network,
SVM, and logistic regression, we use their built-in implemen-
tations from sklearn [26]. We refer to them as NN, SVM, and
LR respectively. We implement the LSTM-based RNN model
in Tensorflow [5]. We refer to it as RNN. For the random
forest models, we use two implementations, one from sklearn,
and the other from XGBoost [12]. We refer to these two as
RF and XGBoost respectively.
Evaluation metrics. We employ two metrics in our evaluation.
One is the AUC score, which is a standard metric to evaluate a
machine learning model’s performance. Note we prefer AUC
score over other standard metrics such as precision, recall,
and F-1 scores, since AUC score is more robust to the data
skew (i.e., in our case, negative examples are 100× more than
positive ones).
Note that our desired properties of the model are: (1) most
of the benign calls should not be predicted as malicious
calls; and (2) a model should identify a new malicious call
number by observing the minimal number of malicious calls.
To examine how well a model can achieve these two goals
compared to the black-listing approach, we design a new
metric, first prediction at label threshold M and precision
p, or FP@(M,p) for short. M is the label threshold. That is, a
phone number is labeled as a malicious call number once it is
labeled at least M times by TouchPal users. In our evaluation,
we consider a simplified setting that every malicious call will
be labeled so, and thus a black-listing approach will pass at
least M malicious calls before the number can be prevented.
We also enforce that the model can achieve a precision ≥ p
on benign calls. In fact, we can always increase the model
threshold τ to increase the precision of a model. For example,
in the extreme case, we can always set τ = +∞, so that almost
all calls are predicted as benign calls to reach a precision of
Model Beijing Sichuan Guangdong Shanghai Zhejiang
RF 0.9985 0.9984 0.9978 0.9978 0.9981
XGBoost 0.9979 0.9981 0.9972 0.9969 0.9977
NN 0.9978 0.9972 0.9961 0.9966 0.9976
RNN 0.9972 0.9962 0.9957 0.9965 0.9975
SVM 0.9914 0.9927 0.9895 0.9892 0.9930
LR 0.9846 0.9822 0.9770 0.9807 0.9848
TABLE IV: AUC scores of different models. Each model is
trained and tested using data from the same province. The
training data uses records between October and November
2016, and the test data uses records in December 2016.
100%. However, in this case, τ is set too high to capture any
malicious calls. Thus, we define τ(p) to be the minimal τ so
that the model’s precision on the benign calls is at least p.
Given a model with τ(p) and a malicious call number, we
are interested in how many call records need be observed
before this number can be predicted as malicious. This value is
then defined as FP@(M,p). Formally, given a number, whose
call records are R1, ..., Rn, FP@(M,p) is defined to be the
smallest i such that the model with τ(p) predicts a input
generated from R1, ..., Ri to be a malicious call. If i > M
or none of such i exists, then FP@(M,p) is defined to be
(M + 1). Given a set of malicious call numbers, we thus can
define averaged FP@(M,p) (or AFP@(M,p) for short) to
be the average of all FP@(M,p) values for the malicious call
numbers in the set.
We want to comment that in the FP (and AFP) metric, we
include the parameter M for soundness. That is, for some
cases, the model will never predict a malicious call number
as malicious. In this case, its FP value would be +∞ without
providing a value M , and thus the AFP metric, which would
be +∞, is not indicative. We mitigate this issue by including
the parameter M in the metric.
Data construction. Given a period of time and a province,
we construct the training data by selecting all malicious
call records from the given province and during the given
period. Since there are much more benign call records than
malicious call records, we sample a subset of all benign calls
which contains the same amount of benign phone numbers as
malicious ones to maintain the balance of positive and negative
samples in the training set. In each of our experiment, we re-
sample the training set 5 times and average their results to
make them robust to the sampling procedure.
Similarly, the test set is constructed in the same way. When
computing the AFP@p metric, however, we use all benign
call records from the given province and in the given period
of time. This is because AFP@p is not sensitive to the ratio
of positive and negative samples.
B. Accuracy experiments
In this section, we evaluate different machine learning
models in terms of their generalizability. We will first examine
the generalizability along the time, and then examine the
generalizability to different provinces. We present the details
below.
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Fig. 7: The ROC curve of different models trained using
Beijing’s call log records during October and November 2016,
and tested on Beijing’s call log records during December 2016
1) Generalizability along the time: Intuitively, we hope a
model trained on the current data logs can serve well in the
future. We call this property the generalizability along the
time. We choose the top-5 provinces with the most amount
of malicious calls. For each province, we train a model using
the data from this province during October and November, and
test it using the data from the same province during December.
AUC scores. The AUC results are presented in Table IV. From
the table, we can observe almost all methods on any province
can achieve an AUC score of 0.985 or higher. This shows
that the model is very accurate on predicting malicious calls.
Different models are listed in the table in the decreasing order
of their performance, from top to bottom. We can observe
that for each province, this order is identical to each other.
RF (i.e., from the sklearn implementation) achieves the best
AUC scores on all provinces, and its AUC performance is at
least 0.9978. Also, the XGBoost implementation can achieve
similar though slightly lower AUC scores.
The two neural network approaches followed the random
forest approaches. Several potential reasons may cause this:
(1) the model’s capacity is not big enough; (2) the problem
has a low-dimension input space, for which a neural network
approach may not always be the best; and (3) random forest
essentially is an ensemble approach, while we do not use
ensemble for our NN approaches. We leave the cause for
further investigation. Surprisingly, the RNN’s performance is
not as good as NN. This may be partialy due to the fact that
the performance gain from historic features is not very big.
We will further examine this hypothesis in Section VII.
The other two traditional approaches, i.e., SVM and logistic
regression, are not as performant as other alternatives. This is
reasonable, since both implementations are essentially linear
classifiers, which may not be expressive enough to handle the
problem.
ROC curve. To better understand the AUC scores, we plot
the ROC curve for model trained and tested on Beijing’s data
in Figure 7. From the figure, we can observe that the areas
under the curves are almost occupying the entire plot —- and
thus the AUC scores are close to 1. This shows that for most
models, the threshold τ can be properly tuned to achieve a
very high recall (i.e., the y-axis value reaches to 1) while very
few benign numbers are predicted as malicious (i.e., the x-axis
value is close to 0). Therefore, the ROC curve further confirms
the effectiveness of our approach.
Averaged first predictions. We now present the results using
the AFP@(M,p) metric for M = 10, 20, 30. The results are
presented in Figure 8. From the figure, we observe that XG-
Boost and NN outperform RF slightly, and the AFP@(M,p)
scores of all these three models are always under 5.5. On the
other hand, for the other three models, i.e., RNN, SVM, and
LR, their AFP@(M,p) scores are close to M , when p is set
to be large, i.e., 99.99%. The reason is that these models are
very hard to achieve a high precision on the benign data to
meet the precision requirement, and thus they tend to label
any call as benign. In this case, the models are not effective
on predicting malicious calls. The random forest models and
the non-recurrent neural network do not suffer this issue.
By varying M from 10 to 30, we observe that the
AFP@(M,p) score of each of the three best models increases
slightly. For example, the score of the best model, XGBoost,
raises from 3.57 to 3.90. This is because these models can
predict a phone number as malicious call number far earlier
before the threshold M is reached.
We consider the total amount of malicious calls that are
not blocked by a black-listing approach and our best machine
learning approach, XGBoost. Assume there are N different
malicious call numbers, then the black-listing approach can-
not prevent N · M malicious calls before it starts to be
effective; using XGBoost, on the other hand, this amount is
N · (AFP@(M,p) − 1). Therefore, XGBoost can reduce the
amount of unprevented malicious calls by 1− AFP@(M,p)−1M .
In our evaluation, XGBoost can achieve a unblocked-call
reduction rate from 75.3% (i.e., M = 10) to 90.3% (i.e.,
M = 30).
We further investigate the first predictions. In particular, we
set each model’s τ to achieve a precision ≥ p. Then, for each
n ∈ {1, ..., 30}, we construct the test data by keeping only
the first n call records of a number. In this test set, we can
compute the malicious call recall as the percentage of correctly
predicted malicious call numbers using only their first n call
records. We call this metric as MR@(n, p), and it provides
finer-grained information than AFP@(M,p). By setting p =
99.99%, we plot the MR@(n, p) curve in Figure 9.
We observe that XGBoost and NN can reach a malicious
call recall higher than 80% by observing 6 or less calls, but
it is hard for any models to reach a malicious call recall
higher than 92%. By closely examining the curves, we observe
that the NN’s recall remains low, and then NN surpasses all
other approaches after n = 7. XGBoost’s recall almost always
remains the best until it is surpassed by NN. This shows
that NN needs to observe more call records to make effective
predictions, while XGBoost requires fewer. We conclude that
the best machine learning approaches, XGBoost and NN, can
capture most of the malicious calls by observing far fewer call
records than a black-listing approach.
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Fig. 8: The AFP@(M,p) of different models trained using Beijing’s call log records during October and November 2016, and
tested on Beijing’s call log records during December 2016.
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Fig. 9: The MR@(n, 0.9999) of different models trained using
Beijing’s call log records during October and November 2016,
and tested on Beijing’s call log records during December 2016
2) Generalizability to other locations: In this section, we
evaluate whether the model trained on data from one province
can generalize to another. We conduct this experiment for
two purposes. First, since the sets of phone numbers from
different provinces are strictly disjoint from each other, this
experiment can give us further insights on whether the model
can generalize to unseen models. Second, some area may have
too few call records to train an effective model, especially at an
early stage of business development in that area. In this case,
using a model trained with data from a different province is
a promising solution. This experiment is helpful to shed new
light on such applications.
We train a model using call logs from Beijing, and eval-
uate it on data from other provinces. We observe the same
phenomenon on the performance of different models in terms
of both AUC scores and the AFP@(M,P ) values. Due to
space limitation, we defer the details of the experiments to the
appendix. We also experiment with the models trained using
data from different provinces. Our observations are consistent
across all experiments. Therefore, we conclude that the model
trained on one province with a large call volume can generalize
to unseen numbers from another province.
C. Runtime evaluation
In this subsection, we evaluate the runtime efficiency for
different models. The experiments are run on a server equipped
with an Intel i7-6900K CPU with 15 cores running at 3.20GHz
and 96GB memory. In our evaluation, all data are pre-loaded
into the memory to eliminate the I/O latency. We repeat each
Fig. 10: Runtime of different models
experiment 5 times and compute the average of different runs
as the result.
For each model, we prepare a sequence of historic features
and the features for the current record. We compute the
model prediction latency from processing raw feature sequence
till the prediction is made. Note that to retrieve the raw
feature sequence, we can leverage the existing key-value store
infrastructure deployed in the TouchPal production pipeline,
which typically takes 1ms to 10ms to retrieve and update a
single record. Thus, an efficient model should not incur a
significant overhead on top of it.
For each model, we feed n = 1, ..., 5 historic records to
construct the inputs to examine the effectiveness of the length
of historic features on the model prediction latency. The results
are presented in Figure 10. We can observe that random forest
models have a high runtime latency ranging from 20ms to
over 100ms. This is because the complexity of the model.
Note each random forest contains 100 decision trees and each
decision tree has three levels. The computation involved in
the prediction process of a random forest is much larger than
other models.
We observe that for all other models, the runtime latency is
less than 2ms, which is a reasonable overhead. In particular, we
find that the model NN, which achieves the third best AUC and
AFP@(M,p) results, also achieves the second lowest model
prediction latency. This is largely due to the simplicity of the
model. Therefore, in the scenario when a tradeoff needs to be
made between the accuracy and the runtime latency, a non-
recurrent neural network may be the best choice in practice.
Further, we observe that when the length of historic feature
sequence increases, the model prediction latency for NN,
RF XGBoost NN RNN SVM LR
All 0.9984 0.9979 0.9977 0.9974 0.9913 0.9846
-His 0.9978 0.9978 0.9961 0.9934 0.9890 0.9730
-CR 0.9444 0.9482 0.9524 0.9556 0.9350 0.9302
Basic 0.9079 0.9112 0.9094 0.9084 0.9023 0.8976
TABLE V: Ablation analysis results. “All” indicates all fea-
tures are used; “-CR” indicates excluding all cross-referencing
features from the input; “-His” excluding all historic features
from the input; “Basic” is equivalent to “-CR-His”. Each cell
(i, j) indicates the AUC scores of a model at column j trained
with data using input feature set corresponding to the row i.
RNN, SVM, LR increases slightly. For the RF and XGBoost
implementations, however, the model prediction latencies for
different sequence lengths do not exhibit an observable differ-
ence. This is because the sequence length only determines
the time to construct the input features, while the model
prediction latency for random forest models is dominated by
the prediction time after the input has been pre-processed.
Note that XGBoost incurs an overhead of 20ms. Therefore,
for practical usage, a neural network approach may be more
suitable since it achieves comparable effectiveness, but re-
quires much less inference time. However, more optimizations
are possible to further accelerate a random forest imple-
mentation. We conclude that most machine learning models
proposed in Section V incur a reasonably small overhead to
be deployed in a real production pipeline.
VII. UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FEATURES.
In this section, we analyze the effectiveness of the proposed
features. We will first perform an ablation study to under-
stand whether adding historic features and/or cross-referencing
features indeed helps to improve the performance. We will
then analyze one of the most performant decision trees to
examine which features are important during the decision
making process.
A. Ablation analysis
In this section, we present an ablation analysis by removing
the historic features and/or cross-referencing features. We
create training data by using Beijing’s October and November
call logs, and test data by using Beijing’s December call logs.
The results are presented in Table V. We observe that the AUC
scores of any model using only the basic set of features are
very low, i.e., around 0.9. Thus using more features from the
call logs are necessary to achieve a better performance.
We further observe that adding any sets of features al-
ways improves the performance, though the improvements are
different. We observe that adding cross-referencing features
(-His) onto basic features can improve the AUC scores by
10%; by adding historic features (-CR), on the other hand, the
improvement is only around 4%− 5%.
Using all features is the most accurate approach, but we
observe that the improvement from adding historic features on
top of cross-referencing features is very small (i.e., < 0.001).
When we want to achieve better efficiency without sacrificing
Fig. 11: The histogram of features based on their frequency
used in the most performant random forest. The features are
listed from left to right in the descending order of their
frequencies. We also show three plots based on the frequency
of each feature appearing at different level of decision trees
in the forest.
the accuracy, however, it can be more efficient by using only
cross-referencing features.
B. Understanding the features used by a well-performing
random forest
We now analyze which of the 29 features are more heavily
used by a well-performing model, and examine which features
are the most representative to interpret the performance of
machine learning models. To do this, we select one the most
performant random forest model trained using XGBoost. It
contains 100 decision trees with each having 3 layers. We
visualize one decision tree in the appendix (see Figure 15).
Each decision tree uses 7 features to reach a leaf (note
features used by lower levels may be duplicate). We thus
compute the frequency of each feature being used among
all 100 decision trees. We plot the histogram based on this
frequency in Figure 11. We can observe a long tail distribution.
In this model, the top-3 features, namely n call, caller outs
of the current call, and caller ins of the current call, are much
more frequently used than other features. The most frequently
used historic feature in this random forest is is in contact, and
it is used by less than 25 decision trees. This observation is
consistent with our ablation analysis.
Note that features at a higher level will be examined more
frequently than the ones at a lower level. We thus analyze
the feature distribution at different levels. We plot three lines
corresponding to the three levels in Figure 11. We observe
that the total frequency of a feature is generally aligned with
the each level’s frequency. For example, the most frequently
used feature in the model, n call, is frequently used in all
three levels. However, there are a few exceptions. For example,
the second frequent feature, caller outs of the current call, is
RF XGBoost NN RNN SVM LR
All 0.9984 0.9979 0.9977 0.9974 0.9913 0.9846
Top-10 0.9965 0.9979 0.9967 0.9803 0.9905 0.9784
TABLE VI: Different models’ AUC scores by using all fea-
tures and only the top-10 features from Figure 11.
used more on the third level, but less on the top level. Such
exceptions are very few.
We observe that only 21 out of the 29 features (i.e., 70%)
are used in the random forest model. If we cut the long tail by
using only features that are used more than 10 times, then only
the top-10 features are necessary. We now examine whether
this top-10 features used in the random forest is indicative
enough for the malicious call prediction problem. In particular,
we use the same setup as our ablation analysis, and evaluate
different models’ performance using only these 10 features.
The results are presented in Table VI. We can observe that, the
XGBoost implementation’s performance does not change at
all. This is particularly because the top-10 features are chosen
to flavor the XGBoost implementation. We observe that all
other models’ AUC scores degrades by 0.001 to 0.01. Such
a degradation is not significant, and the 3 best approaches’
AUC scores are still above 0.9965. Therefore, we conclude
that by analyzing a random forest model, we can find the
most representative features to interpret the performance of
machine learning models.
VIII. DISCUSSION
One limitation of our work is that it cannot effectively
handle caller spoofing. This is a result as we have been
focusing on blacklisting approaches to block malicious calls
based on the numbers. We consider mitigating this issue as an
important future direction.
Also, as mentioned earlier, our system currently cannot
distinguish very well between scam or spam callers and sales-
related callers. As shown in our study, the active time and
whether a number is stored in a TouchPal user’s contact may
potentially be used as features to make such a distinction. We
plan to investigate related issues in the future.
However, our approach is not subject to attackers who
may want to white-list a particular malicious call number.
As explained in Section III, TouchPal employs a blacklisting
mechanism, and thus as long as there are enough benign users
tagging a specific malicious call number, it will be labeled as
malicious regardless of the effort from the attackers. Therefore,
our approach is not subject to data poisoning attackers, who
try to manipulate training data to make the model predict a
malicious call number as benign.
Nevertheless, our machine learning approach may still be
subject to two types of machine learning attackers. First, al-
though attackers cannot white-list malicious call numbers, they
may use poisoning attacks to black-list benign numbers by
setting up a farm to tag benign numbers as malicious. Second,
our proposed machine learning approach may be vulnerable
to evasion attackers, who manipulate the test data during
model serving time. In particular, there are several features,
such as gap to next, that can be intentionally manipulated by
the attacker to mimic a benign caller’s behavior. We consider
mitigating these issues in the future.
IX. RELATED WORKS
A. Existing malicious call detection techniques
There have been many prior works discussing malicious
call detection, such as white/black-listing [17], [25], [35], [39]
and caller’s domain reputation [25], [32]. Our work employs
machine learning approaches to achieve an accurate solution.
Existing works also design machine learning-based mali-
cious call detection approach, relying on caller behavior [30],
[35], recipient behavior [20], [39], social connections [6], [8],
[21], [27], [28], and customer feedbacks [17], [18], [32], [37]–
[39], [41]. However, all these works assume a server in the
telephony network can provide more information about the
caller. In contrast, our work is the first machine learning-
based approach without relying on any assumptions about the
underlying telephony networks.
B. Telephony malicious call analysis
There have been a variety of systematic studies in malicious
call analysis. For example, [15] builds a honeypot with 39,696
phone numbers that are abandoned because former owners
received too many unwanted calls. The incoming calls to these
phone numbers are treated as malicious calls and analyzed. For
more targeted scam calls, such as technical support scams,
existing work [22] does a systematic study of both the scams
and the call centers behind them. These works typically require
recording and analyzing the voice content of the incoming
calls, which may break user privacy. Our analysis does not
touch users’ call content at all, and thus eliminates this privacy
concerns.
Several works describe telephone spam ecosystem and pro-
vide high level evaluation for the existing techniques [29],
[33]. These works highlight the requirements on designing
effective malicious call prevention approaches, while our work
provides a concrete solution.
X. CONCLUSION
In this work, we present the first machine learning-based
solution without relying on any particular assumptions on
the underlying telephony network infrastructures. We propose
several techniques to achieve the goal. We first design a
TouchPal user interface as a component of a mobile App to
allow phone users to label malicious calls. We then conduct
a large scale measurement study over three months of call
logs, including 9 billion records, and design features based on
the results. We extensively evaluate different state-of-the-art
machine learning approaches using the proposed 29 features,
and the results show that the best approach can reduce up
to 90% unpreventable malicious calls while maintaining a
precision over 99.99% over benign call traffic. The results also
show the models can efficiently make the predictions, and thus
can be practically deployed.
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APPENDIX
The daily call volume distributions in November and De-
cember 2016 are presented in Figure 12 and Figure 13
respectively.
(a) Normal calls
(b) Malicious calls
Fig. 12: Histogram of normal calls and malicious calls in
November 2016.
Explanation to neural network models.
We start with the simple case when historic features are
not used. We employ a two-layer feed-forward network. Note
all numeric features are encoded as one-hot vectors. That is,
for a feature taking value v, assuming the feature’s range is
[0,max], then its one hot vector is a (max+1)-dimensional
vector, in which the (v + 1)-th dimension is 1 and all other
dimension is 0. One hot encoding the input numeric feature
is a common practice when using neural networks.
The hidden states contain 20 neurons. The output, which is
a two-dimension vector, is connected with a softmax operator
to compute the final prediction. Formally, the prediction can
be written as
p = softmax
(
W1 × ReLU(W2 × x)
)
where W1 is a 2× 20 matrix, W2 is a 20× n matrix, ReLU
is the standard rectifier function, and n is the input feature
dimension. p is a two-dimensional vector, where p1 indicates
(a) Normal calls
(b) Malicious calls
Fig. 13: Histogram of normal calls and malicious calls in
December 2016.
the probability that the incoming call is a malicious call, and
p0 + p1 = 1 accordingly to the property of softmax. By
setting a model threshold τ , the machine learning model can
predict if the incoming call is a malicious call by checking
p1 ≥ τ . By adjusting the model threshold τ , one trained model
can make a tradeoff between its precision and recall.
To take the historic features into account, one straightfor-
ward way is to treat each record’s features as a vector, and
compute the average of the feature vectors for all historic
records as one fix-length historic feature vector. This historic
feature vector is then concatenated with the feature vector
for the current call, which becomes the input to the neural
network. We refer to this approach as the vanilla NN approach.
However, taking the average may not be the most efficient
way to leverage information from the call log. We can consider
the historic call records from the callee as a sequence with
a variable length. Thus, we can employ a recurrent-neural
network (RNN) [16] to convert the sequence into a fix-length
embedding. In particular, we employ an LSTM [16] with a
hidden state size 16 to compute the embedding, which is then
concatenated with the feature vector for the current call. The
combined feature is then fed into the neural network above to
make the prediction. We refer to this approach as an RNN-
based approach.
Explanation to non-neural network machine learning al-
gorithm.
Although neural network approaches have achieved signif-
icant advancements to handle high-dimensional data, some
RF XGBoost NN RNN SVM LR
Large Provinces
Guangdong 0.9979 0.9970 0.9969 0.9961 0.9893 0.9776
Shanghai 0.9979 0.9969 0.9969 0.9961 0.9892 0.9793
Sichuan 0.9987 0.9983 0.9982 0.9978 0.9926 0.9866
Zhejiang 0.9984 0.9978 0.9976 0.9972 0.9922 0.9847
Small Provinces
Jilin 0.9973 0.9964 0.9961 0.9955 0.9874 0.9713
Guizhou 0.9987 0.9982 0.9981 0.9979 0.9941 0.9865
Anhui 0.9986 0.9979 0.9978 0.9975 0.9927 0.9845
TABLE VII: This table presents the AUC scores of different models when trained on Beijing’s call log from October to
November, and tested on different provinces’ December’s call log. “Large provinces” indicate that the top-5 provinces with
the largest amount of malicious calls; “Small provinces” indicate the three provinces with the least amount of malicious calls.
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Fig. 14: AFP@(30, p) results for different models trained using Beijing’s call logs.
non-neural network approaches are still more effective in han-
dling low-dimensional inputs. In particular, our inputs include
only 29 features, and thus we want to examine whether these
non-neural network approaches are more effective than neural
network ones. In particular, we are interested in (1) random
forest models [10]; (2) Support Vector Machine (SVM) mod-
els [13]; and (3) logistic regression models [14]. We briefly
explain these models below.
Random forest models. A random forest is a collection of
decision trees. Each decision tree is a tree whose each internal
node labels a feature and a threshold. When making prediction,
a decision tree model traverses the tree from the root to a leaf
and determines to move left or right depending on whether
the value of the input feature labeled on the node is smaller
than the threshold or not. Each leaf is associated with a real
value, and the value on the leaf at the end of the traversal
is returned as its output. A random forest model makes the
decision by averaging all values computed from each decision
tree in the forest to receive a final value p. Again, the decision
can be made by setting a threshold τ , in a similar manner as
the neural network approaches explained earlier.
SVM models. The SVM model is designed to handle the
problem when the training data is not linearly separable. In
particular, it employs a mapping φ specified by the user to map
the input feature into a high-dimensional space, and then train
a model y = w ·φ(x)+ b, such that the decision plane defined
by w and b maximizes the margin, while allowing a few
training data to be misclassified. Typically, the φ is provided
as a kernel function κ, such that κ(x, x′) = φ(x) · φ(x′). The
prediction is also made by using the κ function directly. In our
case, we employ the linear kernel function to train the SVM
model. Note that SVM also emits a real value, which can be
used for prediction.
Logistic models. The logistic model can be considered as
a one-layer neural network: p = σ(wx + b), where σ is
the sigmoid function. This model is commonly applied in
industrial applications due to its simplicity and efficiency.
However, it may not be as efficient as other alternatives. The
output p can be used to make predictions.
Note that all these models take a fix-length input. Thus,
we employ the same method in the vanilla NN approach to
compute one historic embedding for all historic records.
Detailed evaluation results for generalizability to other
locations.
In particular, we construct the training data using Beijing’s
October and November 2016’s call logs. We choose 7 other
provinces, 4 with large call volumes and 3 with small ones,
and use their December 2016’s call logs to construct 7 test sets
respectively. We train the model using the same training set,
and evaluate them on the 7 different test sets respectively. The
AUC results are reported in Table VII. We observe that the
performance of different models are consistent with previous
Fig. 15: One example decision tree in the best random forest
model trained using XGBoost. Each internal node indicates
one feature to be examined. One of its down-going edge is
labeled with a checking condition, while the other is labeled
with “else”. Each leaf node is associated with a value.
experiments. Each model trained using Beijing’s data can
achieve a comparable AUC performance to the model trained
using the test province itself, which shows that the model can
indeed generalize to unseen numbers from a different location.
By taking a close look, interestingly, we observe that when
the model is trained using data from Beijing, its AUC score on
another province is even slightly higher than the model trained
using the data from the tested province itself. For example, the
AUC score of RF on Guangdong is 0.9979 when trained using
Beijing’s data, while the value is 0.9978 when the model is
trained using Guangdong’s data. Since Beijing has the largest
amount of malicious call records, this shows that a larger
training set may help to improve the performance.
We present the AFP@(M,p) results for M = 30 and the
test sets constructed using call log records from Zhejiang
(large call volume) and from Guizhou (small call volume)
in Figure 14. We make similar observations as previous
experiments: (1) the ranks of different models with respect
to the AFP@(M,p) are in general consistent with previous
observations; (2) random forest models and the NN model’s
AFP@p values are all below 5.
Visualization of a decision tree. In Figure 15, we visualize
one decision tree in the random forest trained using XGBoost
on October and November’s data in Guangzhou.
